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ABSTRACT
The problem of potential overuse of the health care delivery system
has plagued governmental efforts to provide comprehensive care on a
prepaid basis on a statewide or nationwide scale. The overuse would
theoretically be generated when prepayment dropped the out-of-pocket
cost of medical care to zero.
The present study contrasts lengths -of-stay under the conventional
system of payment with lengths-of-stay at a military hospital, and
derives partial in and out patient utilization rates for the population
served at the relatively large military hospital (where health care is
essentially free) and draws preliminary conclusions and conjectures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A . BACKGROUND
Over the past two decades there has taken strong root in this country
the belief that each and every citizen has the right to some degree of
access to health care. (Health care is defined to include both curative
and preventive care). The belief by many is that health care should, not
be a privilege that derives from one's social status or ability to pay.
The minimum bundle of health care benefits that constitutes this right
is a matter of wide debate , but the debate is over the amount that
constitutes this right and not over the fact that one has a right to
some amount
.
There are several pieces of legislation that have been introduced
in both the California state legislature and the Congress of the United
States calling for public provision of health care. The various bills
exhibit considerable variation in the way and extent to which such care
is to be publicly provided or financed. It should be noted that public
provision in the United States especially the large increments in
publically financed care that have occurred in recent years (i.e..
Medicare and Medicaid), have only affected the amounts and distribution
of care which continues to be essentially produced in the customary
manner. For example, pending nationally there is:
(1 ) a tax-credit approach embodied in the Health Care Insurance
Act (also known as medicredit);
(2) the mixed and limited public -private approaches of (a) The
National Health Insurance and Health Improvement Act and (b) the Nixon

Administration's National Health Insurance Partnership Act;
(3) the basic ly completely comprehensive public approach of
the Health Security Act sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy.
A pre-paid capitation scheme of health care (Appendix A, #1 ) vis a
vis a fee-for-service scheme (Appendix A, #2) would seem to correct
some inequities in the current delivery of health services:
(1
)
No longer would hospitals be reimbursed on a "cost-plus"
basis as they are under a fee-for-services scheme.
(2) There would be monetary incentives for the doctor not to
overprescribe or overutilize hospital facilities.
However an outcropping in this solution attempt presents a possible
problem area of its own. That is, elimination of the fee as an entry
rationing device into health care may cause overuse by the consumer.
B. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
It has been conjectured that for a fixed or comprehensive bundle of
health care when the immediate out-of-pocket cost to the consumer is
very small or zero the system providing the care will be mortally
overused. There are two areas where this overutilization is most likely
to occur:
(1 ) outpatient services, i.e., number of times ambulatory care
is used, use by "worried well" (Appendix A, #5)j etc.
(2) inpatient facilities, i.e., overlong lengths of stay and
admissions, use by patients better served at outpatient facilities, etc.
To date studies addressing these problems have not been unambiguous.
Discussing the report "Prepayment for Hospital Care in New York State",
Harris /1 1
,
p.201_7 indicates, "These studies point to varying use of
hospitals according to the type of insurance: Full coverage or not?

Fee-for-service or fixed total charge? Doctors limited to panel or
free choice?" See also Klarman /l~3, P-32_7 for a further discussion on
the "abuse" of hospital care services.
Peter Fischer describing a system of public health provision in
British Columbia indicates the onus of preventing overutilization was
left to the doctors and it has been relatively successful. f&, p.191ff_7
It would seem that if one were able to quantify the usage a popula-
tion made of essentially costless medical care one would have made an
essential first step in the prediction of overutilization or abuse of
state or federally provided health care delivery systems.
C. MORAL HAZARD
Consider more specifically the overutilization concept previously
mentioned in connection with health care insurance, that which has been
termed "moral hazard" . It has been defined as "the intangible loss
producing propensities of the individual assured". /9 , p-332/ It is
any situation or circumstance that might indicate a desire on the part
of the assured that the loss occur. In particular in the health in-
surance field it is the phenomenon of demanding more health "are at a
zero price than a positive one and in particular significantly more
care. ..If moral hazard obtains complete reliance on economic incentives
will not in general lead to an optimal allocation of resources /Jx, p.5>38_7.
Crew / 7_7 has shown that the extent of moral hazard can be determined
by the price elasticity of the demand curve (Appendix A, #6). The
greater the moral hazard the greater the elasticity, and •vice versa.
If moral hazard is indeed a determining factor in a health consumer's
behavior it would be extremely helpful to be able to identify those
areas where moral hazard might be significant, so that upon implementation

of this or similar legislation close monitoring of the troublesome
areas would detect overutilization before it became economically-
catastrophic .
Another area that becomes important in the light of moral hazard is
the administrative costs that will be involved in assuring that people
only consume the right amount of care. That is to say, if moral hazard
exists to a significant degree there would arise a cost-analysis problem
of determining whether the administrative costs involved in ensuring
that people only consume the right amount of care is justified vis a vis
the costs brought on by overuse.
D. TYPICAL LEGISLATION
It might be beneficial if one were to focus on a typical piece of
pending health care legislation. A good example is California State
Senate Bill 770, The Consumer Health Protection Act of 1972, introduced
by Senator George Moscone. It would provide for a statewide compulsory
comprehensive health insurance plan, financed through payroll taxes
with employer-employee contributions and statewide property tax plus
existing sources of funding (viz . Medicare and Medicaid). The state
would establish the plan basically through capitation contracts
under which the state would pay a specified amount per enrollee to the
prepaid health plan. It would designate a percentage of the revenues
for purposes of health resource development with priority to under-
served communities and for developing health programs to meet special
health problems, including those anticipated in high risk populations.
The full range of health services would be covered including pre-
vention, screening, annual health assessment, diagnosis and treatment
of illnesses, both in and out of the hospital, extended care, medical

rehabilitation , medically justified nursing home care, and care provided
in organized home care programs. All legal residents of the state would
be eligible (federal workers and armed services personnel are excluded,
but federal employees may participate on a voluntary basis).
E. THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE - THEORETICAL
In the traditional market setting the consumer selected and paid for
those health services from which he might reasonably expect to receive
a visible payoff. The payoff might conceivably be the correction of a
malady or if no malady exists the peace of mind that comes from being
reassured by a professional. Graphically his demand curves might look
like this
:
High!
D
'jOW (Intensive Care Unit Days, Hospital Days)
Q
Figure 1 . Consumer Demand for Life Sustaining Health
Services as a Function of Price /T, p. 236, Fig \\7

High
Low (Hospital Days & Outpatient Services)
Q
Figure 2 . Consumer Demand for Health Services to Alleviate
Minor Health Problems as a Function of Price
/1, P- 237, Fig ^7
High
$
D
Low (Outpatient Services)
Q
Figure 3 . Consumer Demand for Preventive Health Services as
a Function of Price /J, p. 238, Fig 67

In Figure 1 one can note that the quantity demanded is relatively
insensitive to the price of the service. In this case there is rela-
tively low price elasticity of demand.
Figure 2 shows that effect of price upon the demand for nonserious,
curative medical services to be quite strong. A high price elasticity
of demand obtains
.
The DD portion of Figure 3 indicates that few consumers buy these
services at high prices and only a somewhat larger number buy these
services as price decreases. The DD portion shows what the probable
effect would be if substantial educational effort and improved tech-
niques of practice were used to reduce the uncertainty of the value
attached to these services. Presumably if the consumer knows the bene-
fits of utilizing these services particularly in light of their low
cost he will demand more and there will exist high price elasticity of
demand
.
If Figure 3 were to appear as in Figure k
D
Q
Figure li-
lt would indicate that except for a relatively small range of prices
the health consumer has a relatively low price elasticity of demand
and there would be little or no concern about the overuse due to con-
sumer moral hazard, depending on the cost of providing the excess care
vs. the administrative costs of preventing overutilization previously
mentioned
.
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F. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
If one were to cast the situation facing a worried but well health
consumer who is a member of a prepaid group into non-zero sum game
theoretic terms; and considering the strategies he has to be dichotomous:
B
overuse not overuse
overuse
not
overuse
(*,*) (6,1)
(1,6) (2,2)
The payoffs in the game are selected arbitrarily and only to give
substance to the analysis:
Consumer A can overuse: (1 ) if each other consumer B elects
to overuse then consumer A gets
psychic benefits, but the total
benefit he receives is diminished
somewhat since he has to pay time
cost of waiting in a presumably
long queue and paying an increase
in taxes to pay for his and everyone
else's overuse.
(2) if each other consumer B elects
not to overuse then consumer A gets
the psychic benefits, but his total
benefits are not diminished by time
cost or increase in taxes.
11

Consumer A can not overuse: (1 ) if each other consumer B
elects to overuse then consumer
A still has the peace of mind
associated with having a system
available if an emergency should
occur, but now his benefits are
diminished since he has to pay
an increased tax bill.
(2) if each other consumer B
elects not to overuse consumer
A still has peace of mind
associated with having the
system available if an emergency
should occur, but now that
benefit is not diminished by
an increase in taxes.
G. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
1
.
Comparing the mean length of stay for 20 various selected
disease/conditions for inpatients at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital, F .
Ord, California with the mean length of hospital stay obtained by
Hyman Joseph /~1 2_7 for the same disease/conditions.
2. A utilization study of inpatient and outpatient services at
Silas B. Hays Army Hospital, Ft. Ord, California with potentially useful
statistics presented. The utility of the statistics will depend in
large measure on the context in which they are applied, but because the
population served has been so finely calculated they are viewed as a
contribution to the empirical literature of hospital service utilization.
12

II. INPATIENT COMPARISON
Professor Hyman Joseph in a study on moral hazard gave figures
based on data from patients' discharge records from 27 Iowa hospitals
for the period from November 1965 to April 1 966 for selected diseases
and conditions
.
Comparable data were culled for Fiscal Year 1971 from Silas B. Hays
Army Hospital, Ft. Ord, California.
The hypothesis: fj„. — p^. was tested, where /J„. is the population
mean length of hospital stay at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital for disease/
condition i, and /J is the population mean length of hospital stay at
an Iowa hospital for disease/condition i.
The method of pooled variance was used: an °^ = .01, and a
statistic
*i
'
x
Ii
- X
Hi
sp'
/ K + ^Hi
where X-. = sample mean length of hospital stay for disease i at an
Iowa hospital.
Nj. = sample size of patients for disease i at an Iowa hospital.
2
Sj. = sample variance from the mean length of hospital stay for
disease i at an Iowa hospital.
X„. = sample mean length of hospital stay for disease i at
Silas B. Hays Army Hospital.
Nt,. = sample size of patients for disease i at Silas B. Hays
Army Hospital.
13

Tli
and where
sample variance from the mean length of stay for disease
i at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital.
\ (NHi-1) S^,+(NT,-1) S?,"Hi v"li Ii
(NHi+ Nn -2)
t. was assumed to have a t distribution with (N-r. + Ntt- - 2) degrees
of freedom. The hypothesis was rejected if t . 4. t q* .
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The following diseases/conditions were significant at a .99 prob-
ability since t for all diseases/conditions was -2.326:3
.01
Diabetes Mellitus
Hemorrhoids
Hypertrophy of tonsils and adenoids
Ulcer of Duodenum
Gastritis and Duodenitis, Gastrohepatitis
Acute appendicitis
Hernia of Abdominal Cavity without mention of' obstruction
Fracture of neck of femur, Hip
If the confidence limit was relaxed to .95 an additional disease/
condition was significant:
Cholelithiasis, Colic
18

III. INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT UTILIZATION
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1972 Monthly Average Population
1 972 Total Clinic-Dispensary Visits
Annual number of visits to clinic
-
dispensary per member of population
1 972 Monthly Average proportion of
population using clinic-dispensary daily
73,152.08
163,725
It63,725
73,152.08
• 01 7U
6.3U
It has been conjectured that hospital bed utilization is a function
wherein the demand for beds is not an exogenous variable'; that is that
demand for beds is some function of the supply for beds and the length
of the queue /Jo, 157- Early in 1972 the hospital facilities at Ft.
Ord were changed. The newer hospital had I4I4.O beds available, plus a
large ward of the old hospital kept available primarily for troops who
came down with acute respiratory disease, adding another 120 beds.
The old hospital had 850 beds available . The hypothesis was made that
there is no difference in the monthly mean number of admissions at the
new hospital compared with the old.
Ho: /J
N
-/J
.
a t-statistic was used with «^ = .05
,
-
XN " X
1 1
*' i
N
N *0
where
<NN- i) 4 + <No- i > sI
(N + N
N
2)
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X . . = 389.26 X = 375.88
old new
N .,, = 1£ N = 9
. old ^ new
S
2
= 2827-61; S
2
= 2178.62
old new
t gr,^ = 2.07it 22 degrees of freedom
t
?023
-
=
-2.07^
t = -.6233
The hypothesis that there was no difference between the monthly mean
number of admissions of the two groups cannot be rejected, indicating
that in this particular case demand for hospital beds did not seem to be
a function of the supply of hospital beds. In this particular case
doctors did not appear to be acting as filtering elements in keeping a
constant percentage of the beds filled.
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IV . RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
1 . A statistical test, the t test, was used in order to obviate
any false conclusions that might arise from strictly comparing the mean
lengths of stay without regard for the variance of the length of stay.
A strict comparison of the means however might be informative
and probably some information on existing hospital policy or population
biases might be inferred from it. For example, the large absolute
difference between the mean lengths of stay for 'fracture of neck of
femur, hip'; in Joseph's study the mean length of stay was 2I4.3 days
whereas for the Army Hospital study the mean length of stay was 81 . 5>5>
days, a not inconsiderable difference. There exist in the military
services what are called 'medical boards ' which comment on the efficacy
of retaining a severely injured person in the service as fit for duty.
There is a considerable amount of administrative paperwork involved in
releasing a person from active duty during which time presumably the
recuperating person is kept in the hospital. A second contributing
factor to the apparently significantly longer length of stay in the
Army Hospital could be that if an Army enlisted man at Fort Ord for
training broke his hip he would have to spend a significantly longer
recuperative period in the hospital than his civilian counterpart since,
unlike his civilian counterpart, he can't just go home and have his
family help him in his late recuperative phase because Army barracks
aren't arranged that way.
This is attested to by the large variance evident in the Army
Hospital length of stay. The Army Hospital does serve a distinctly
2k

'double humped' population. A vast majority of the population falls
into one of two categories:
(1) between 18-23 years old, stationed at Ft. Ord for
training,
(2) older than 55 years old, retired military service
personnel.
The former would presumably be unable to spend the late recuperative
phase at home whereas the latter would, thus leading to a relatively
large variance in the respective length of stays.
2. The prescriptions of the typical Army doctor cannot be con-
sidered as either an indicator of the medical actions of a doctor work-
ing under the current fee-for-service system nor those of a doctor
working under a capitation form of remuneration.
For an Army doctor there is no incentive to overpre scribe as
there is under the current fee-for-service payment system, nor are
there incentives for the typical Army doctor to over-economize and
give less than adequate service to the health care consumer which is
one of the predicted (but not substantiated) effects of a capitation
form of payment. The Army doctor receives his salary regardless of how
many patients he sees or how he utilizes the existing hospital facilities.
In short he is not motivated to overprescribe as he is in the
civilian world nor is he induced to perhaps economize in order to save
himself money as he would be under the capitation contract form of
payment. But perhaps because he isn't affected in the pocketbook he
can be looked at as prescribing what he considers, exclusive of any
monetary influence, the correct amount.
25

3. For 9 out of the 20 diseases/conditions tested for the Silas B.
Hays Army Hospital vs. Iowa hospitals the mean length of stay at the
Army Hospital was significantly longer at a .9!? confidence level. The
ramifications of these diseases/conditions leading to longer lengths
of stay when the cost of longer stay to the consumer is essentially
zero might be that more stringent administration controls are called
for in certain areas, particularly in this case in the area of gastro-
intestinal diagnosis and treatment. The costs of a small amount of
policing in this area might yield significant dividents in savings
associated with decreased overutilization.
k- That at a .95 confidence level there was no statistical change
in the average monthly number of patients admitted, even though the
number of beds available decreased by over 3h percent.
£. To the extent that Senator Moscone's Bill calls for restructur-
ing the delivery system of health care it will guard against overutili-
zation.
(a) The use of paramedical personnel to screen the worried
well and to educate the general populace of the value of preventive
health services will insure that the doctor working in the outpatient
clinic sees only patients that need his services.
(b) Since the doctor is on a strict capitation schedule it is
to his economic benefit not to overprescribe or overuse facilities.
The more patients he has inpatient in a hospital the fewer patients he
can see in the outpatient clinic or his office.
6. It seems that it is rational economic behavior on the part of
the consumer to overuse or attempt to overuse the available health care
delivery system when the cost to him, viewed as the sum of out-of-pocket
26

costs and time costs is very low or zero. This would be especially-
pertinent to the medically indigent whose time costs are very low and
who at present aren't receiving health care because the out-of-pocket
costs are relatively high.
1 . It is felt that the population which uses the inpatient facili-
ties and the specialty clinics at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital might be
larger than is given. The population base figure does not include the
military service personnel assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School
and their dependents, which account for an additional 6100-6^00 people
(approximately). The Navy runs a general outpatient clinic and dis-
pensary at the Naval Postgraduate School Annex which takes care of
general maladies, innoculations, physical examinations and x-rays but
refers special cases to the specialized outpatient clinics or for admit-
tance to Silas B. Hays Army Hospital.
8. Some comparisons which might be useful to indicate trends:
(a) Compared with "national rates for outpatient visits (ex-
cluding telephone calls) for the period July 1966 - June 1967 were 3-
per person for all regions, Ij.
.
3 for the West, and lj.8 for the San Frs -
Cisco area" /~~1 9_7, it seemed that the rate for Silas B. Hays Army
Hospital of 6.3k per person seemed significantly high.
(b) In utilization data obtained under the National Health
Service in England / 1 0_7, the average admissions per 1000 population
was 78.J4.5 and the mean length of stay was 19-li compared with the average
admissions per 1000 population served at Silas B. Hays Army Hospital in
1972 of 36.2 and the mean length of stay of £.1£.
These comparisons are useful only in the most general way and
specific correlations should not be inferred.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS:
1 . Fee -for Service (ffs) : The customary manner by which health care
is currently paid for. The service, whether it be physician,
hospital, or drug, is paid for each time it is used.
2. Pre-paid Capitation : The consumer or his employer pays a predeter-
mined annual amount to the doctor's fiscal intermediary. For
that period of time the consumer has the right to visit the
doctor as often as he desires. The doctor is rewarded on the
basis of the number of patients he can be responsible for.
3- Outpatient Services : These typically include general clinical
services for unspecified malaise ; referral to particular
clinics, e.g., cardiology, pediatrics, and obstetrics ; physical
examinations; x-rays; eye examinations; and immunization.
h' Inpatient Services : Surgery; extended treatment after admission to
the hospital; maternity care.
5>. Worried Well : A person who is not physically sick and hence not
needing curative care, but who seeks care regardless.
6. Price Elasticity of Demand : "...a concept devised to indicate the
degree of responsiveness of Q (quantity) demanded to changes
in market P (price). It depends primarily on percentage changes
and is independent of the units used to measure Q and P. Elas-
ticity ends up qualitatively in one of three alternative
categories
.
1 ) When a cut in P raises Q so much as to increase total
revenue P X Q, we speak of elastic or of elasticity of
demand greater than unity.
2) When a cut in P results in an exactly compensating rise
in Q so as to leave total revenue P X Q unchanged, we
speak of unitary elasticity of demand or of elasticity
of demand that is numerically exactly equal to unity.
28

3) When- a percentage cut in P evokes so small a percentage
increase in Q as to make total revenue P X Q fall, we
speak of inelastic demand or of elasticity of demand
that is less than unity (but not less than zero)."
/"18 7
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